Arbeitspapier

Trust in generosity: An experiment of the repeated Yes-No game

This paper reports results of a 100-round Yes-No game experiment conducted under the random matching protocol. In contrast to ultimatum bargaining, the responder in the Yes-No game decides whether to accept without knowing the proposer's offer. Although both games have the same solution outcome (i.e., the proposer offers the smallest possible amount and the responder accepts), the set of equilibria of the ultimatum bargaining game is rather large whereas the equilibrium of the Yes-No game is essentially unique. Avrahami et al. (2013) found an immediate convergence to proposers offering an equal split in their repeated ultimatum bargaining experiment. Our main interest is which dynamics emerge when proposers and responders repeatedly play the Yes-No game. We found neither convergence to offering an equal split nor to the solution outcome. Most participants display a surprising constancy of behavior but the categories of behavior are rather rich.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2014-024

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Subject
laboratory experiment
learning
repetition
veto power
Yes-No game
Pavitt's sectoral taxonomy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Güth, Werner
Otsubo, Hironori
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(where)
Jena
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Güth, Werner
  • Otsubo, Hironori
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2014

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