Time to defect: repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments with uncertain horizon

Arbeitspapier

Using a symmetric 2-person prisoners’ dilemma as the base game, each player receives a signal for the number of rounds to be played with the same partner. The actual number of rounds (the length of the supergame) is determined by the maximal signal where each player expects the other’s signal to be smaller, respectively larger, by a fixed number of rounds with 50% probability. In the tradition of Folk Theorems we show that both, mutual defection and mutual cooperation until the individually perceived last round, are subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. We find experimental evidence that many players do in fact cooperate beyond their individual signal period.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,098

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Expectations; Speculations
• Subject: Prisoners’ dilemma ; Continuation probability ; Uncertainty ; Experiment ; Gefangenendilemma ; Wiederholte Spiele ; Kooperation ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bruttel, Lisa V. ; Güth, Werner ; Kamecke, Ulrich
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25672
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET