Arbeitspapier
Time to defect: repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments with uncertain horizon
Using a symmetric 2-person prisoners dilemma as the base game, each player receives a signal for the number of rounds to be played with the same partner. The actual number of rounds (the length of the supergame) is determined by the maximal signal where each player expects the others signal to be smaller, respectively larger, by a fixed number of rounds with 50% probability. In the tradition of Folk Theorems we show that both, mutual defection and mutual cooperation until the individually perceived last round, are subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. We find experimental evidence that many players do in fact cooperate beyond their individual signal period.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,098
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Expectations; Speculations
- Thema
-
Prisoners dilemma
Continuation probability
Uncertainty
Experiment
Gefangenendilemma
Wiederholte Spiele
Kooperation
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bruttel, Lisa V.
Güth, Werner
Kamecke, Ulrich
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bruttel, Lisa V.
- Güth, Werner
- Kamecke, Ulrich
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2007
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