Arbeitspapier

Equity versus efficiency? Evidence from three-person generosity experiments

In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier results for two-person generosity games show that participants seem to care more for efficiency than for equity. In three-person generosity games equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer's agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2010,018

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
generosity game
equity
efficiency
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Güth, Werner
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
Stribeck, Agnes
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(wo)
Jena
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Güth, Werner
  • Pull, Kerstin
  • Stadler, Manfred
  • Stribeck, Agnes
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2010

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