Arbeitspapier
Procedurally fair collective provision: Its requirements and experimental functionality
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects´ costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2013-034
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
- Subject
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bidding behavior
procedural fairness
public project
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Güth, Werner
Kliemt, Hartmut
Koukoumelis, Anastasios
Levati, M. Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (where)
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Jena
- (when)
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2013
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Güth, Werner
- Kliemt, Hartmut
- Koukoumelis, Anastasios
- Levati, M. Vittoria
- Ploner, Matteo
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2013
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