Arbeitspapier
Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4541
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
- Thema
-
public project
bidding behavior
procedural fairness
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Kliemt, Hartmut
Koukoumelis, Anastasios
Levati, M. Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Kliemt, Hartmut
- Koukoumelis, Anastasios
- Levati, M. Vittoria
- Ploner, Matteo
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2013
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