Arbeitspapier
Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis
We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings of the three alternatives). In a laboratory experiment we test the robustness of the rule to the introduction of subsidies and taxes. We have two main results. First, in all treatments, the most frequently chosen ranking is the socially efficient one. Second, subsidies slightly enhance overbidding. Furthermore, an analysis of individual bid vectors reveals interesting behavioral regularities.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2012,005
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
bidding behavior
procedural fairness
voting paradox
Gruppenentscheidung
Ranking-Verfahren
Gerechtigkeit
Abstimmungsparadoxon
Test
Subvention
Steuer
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Levati, M. Vittoria
Montinari, Natalia
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Levati, M. Vittoria
- Montinari, Natalia
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study
Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment
Heuristics as decision rules: Part I: the single consumer
The minority of three-game: An experimental and theoretical analysis
Competition on common value markets with naèive traders: a theoretical and experimental analysis
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study
Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment
Heuristics as decision rules: Part I: the single consumer
The minority of three-game: An experimental and theoretical analysis
Competition on common value markets with naèive traders: a theoretical and experimental analysis
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
A non-Bayesian approach to (un)bounded rationality
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Sequential versus independent commitment: An indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study
Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment
Heuristics as decision rules: Part I: the single consumer
The minority of three-game: An experimental and theoretical analysis
Competition on common value markets with naèive traders: a theoretical and experimental analysis
Prior-free optimality and satisficing: a common framework and its experimental implementation
Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis