Arbeitspapier

Competition on common value markets with naèive traders: a theoretical and experimental analysis

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiring a company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition of both, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higher prices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers increases prices, competition of naive sellers promotes effciency enhancing trade. Our predictions are tested experimentally.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,105

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Thema
Übernahme
Wettbewerb
Auktionstheorie
Unvollkommene Information
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chlaß, Nadine
Güth, Werner
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(wo)
Jena
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Chlaß, Nadine
  • Güth, Werner
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2007

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