Arbeitspapier

Satisficing and prior-free optimality in price competition: a theoretical and experimental analysis

On a heterogeneous experimental oligopoly market, sellers choose a price, specify a set-valued prior-free conjecture about the others' behavior, and form their own profit-aspiration for each element of their conjecture. We formally define the concepts of satisficing and prior-free optimality and check if seller participants behave in accordance with them. We find that seller participants are satisficers, but fail to be prior-free optimal.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2008,067

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Subject
Satisficing behavior
bounded rationality
triopoly
Oligopol
Preiswettbewerb
Beschränkte Rationalität
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(where)
Jena
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Güth, Werner
  • Levati, Maria Vittoria
  • Ploner, Matteo
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2008

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