Arbeitspapier
Strategic delegation in price competition
We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the importance of both intrafirm- and interfirm interactions of principals and agents in competition. We show that price delegation can increase or decrease the firms' surplus depending on the heterogeneity of the market and the number of agents employed by the firms.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 43
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
Strategic delegation
Agency theory
Revenue sharing
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
- (wo)
-
Tübingen
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-63740
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 10:44 UTC
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Pull, Kerstin
- Stadler, Manfred
- University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
Entstanden
- 2012
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