Arbeitspapier

Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring?

Personal information is shared extensively every day, partly in exchange for benefits or as a reaction to other people's information sharing. In this paper, we experimentally investigate these two factors by analyzing the interaction of peer comparison and incentives to disclose potentially privacy-sensitive information. We find that information sharing is higher under incentives, and further increases under peer comparison. This effect is driven by those initially disclosing less, who additionally report to feel more compelled to reveal information. Our results provide an explanation for the current information sharing trend while pointing to a potentially neglected side-effect.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2019/4

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Distribution: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
Personal information disclosure
Peer comparison
Incentives
Experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ackfeld, Viola
Güth, Werner
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ackfeld, Viola
  • Güth, Werner
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Time of origin

  • 2019

Other Objects (12)