Arbeitspapier
Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring?
Personal information is shared extensively every day, partly in exchange for benefits or as a reaction to other people's information sharing. In this paper, we experimentally investigate these two factors by analyzing the interaction of peer comparison and incentives to disclose potentially privacy-sensitive information. We find that information sharing is higher under incentives, and further increases under peer comparison. This effect is driven by those initially disclosing less, who additionally report to feel more compelled to reveal information. Our results provide an explanation for the current information sharing trend while pointing to a potentially neglected side-effect.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2019/4
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Distribution: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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Personal information disclosure
Peer comparison
Incentives
Experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ackfeld, Viola
Güth, Werner
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
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2019
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ackfeld, Viola
- Güth, Werner
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Time of origin
- 2019