Arbeitspapier

Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring?

Personal information is shared extensively every day, partly in exchange for benefits or as a reaction to other people's information sharing. In this paper, we experimentally investigate these two factors by analyzing the interaction of peer comparison and incentives to disclose potentially privacy-sensitive information. We find that information sharing is higher under incentives, and further increases under peer comparison. This effect is driven by those initially disclosing less, who additionally report to feel more compelled to reveal information. Our results provide an explanation for the current information sharing trend while pointing to a potentially neglected side-effect.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2019/4

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Distribution: General
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Personal information disclosure
Peer comparison
Incentives
Experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ackfeld, Viola
Güth, Werner
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ackfeld, Viola
  • Güth, Werner
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2019

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