Arbeitspapier

Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions

Two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or through (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for agents to care for sales, or evolve as sellers who care for sales in addition to profits. The two approaches are conceptually quite different, yet similar in the sense that both allow certain kinds of commitment. We show that when the two models are set up in intuitively comparable ways strategic delegation does not change the market results as compared to the usual duopoly solution, while indirect evolution causes a more competitive behavior. Thus the case at hand underscores the differences between the two approaches in explaining economic institutions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1998:9

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Thema
Indirect evolution
strategic delgation
commitment
duopoly markets
agency theory

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dufwenberg, Martin
Güth, Werner
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Uppsala
(wann)
1998

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2415
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dufwenberg, Martin
  • Güth, Werner
  • Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1998

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