Hochschulschrift
Entrepreneurs' strategic decision making : experimental studies on strategic and exogenous uncertainty
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
Berlin, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Diss., 2011
- Keyword
-
Unternehmer
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Experiment
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (who)
-
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
- (when)
-
2012
- Creator
- Contributor
-
Schade, Christian
Güth, Werner
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-100201218
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:27 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Hochschulschrift
Associated
- Böwe, Sabrina
- Schade, Christian
- Güth, Werner
- Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Time of origin
- 2012
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