Arbeitspapier
Satisficing and prior-free optimality in price competition: a theoretical and experimental analysis
On a heterogeneous experimental oligopoly market, sellers choose a price, specify a set-valued prior-free conjecture about the others' behavior, and form their own profit-aspiration for each element of their conjecture. We formally define the concepts of satisficing and prior-free optimality and check if seller participants behave in accordance with them. We find that seller participants are satisficers, but fail to be prior-free optimal.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2008,067
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- Thema
-
Satisficing behavior
bounded rationality
triopoly
Oligopol
Preiswettbewerb
Beschränkte Rationalität
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Levati, Maria Vittoria
- Ploner, Matteo
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008