Endogenous price leadership: A theoretical and experimental analysis

Arbeitspapier

We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers can adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader then clears the market by serving the residual demand. Firms with different marginal costs would induce different prices if they were price leaders. Somewhat counter-intuitively, lower marginal costs of the leader imply higher prices. We compare two mechanisms to determine the price leader in a between-subjects design, majority voting and competitive bidding. The experimental data of later rounds support our theoretical finding that experienced price leaders with lower marginal costs choose higher prices. In the majority voting treatment, participants with higher marginal costs more often establish the lowest cost competitor as price leader in order to induce a higher sales price.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2013-039

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
• Thema: bidding ; experimental economics ; majority voting ; price leadership

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Güth, Werner ; Pull, Kerstin ; Stadler, Manfred ; Zaby, Alexandra
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (wo): Jena
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85028
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ