Arbeitspapier
The balanced solution for cooperative transferable utility games
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this contribution we de¯ne the balanced solution which assigns weights to players such that the corresponding weighted Shapley value of each player is equal to her weight. We prove its existence for all monotone transferable utility games, discuss other properties of this solution, and deal with its characterization through a reduced game consistency.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,073
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
Balanced solution
Proportionality
Reduced game consistency
Weight- ed Shapley value
Shapley-Wert
Kooperatives Spiel
Transferable Utility Games
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van den Brink, René
Levínský, René
Zelen, Miroslav
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van den Brink, René
- Levínský, René
- Zelen, Miroslav
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2007
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