Arbeitspapier
Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements
We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 16.2007
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
- Thema
-
Water Allocation
Stability
Climate Change
Game Theory
Klimaveränderung
Spieltheorie
Wasserversorgung
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ansink, Erik
Ruijs, Arjan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ansink, Erik
- Ruijs, Arjan
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2007
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