Hochschulschrift
Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISBN
-
9783890125077
3890125077
- Dimensions
-
21 cm
- Extent
-
VII, 179 S.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
graph. Darst.
Zugl.: Kiel, Univ., Diss., 1995
- Bibliographic citation
-
Reihe Quantitative Ökonomie ; Bd. 72
- Keyword
-
Kontrakttheorie
Agency-Theorie
Moral Hazard
Adverse Selektion
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Bergisch Gladbach, Köln, Lohmar
- (who)
-
Eul
- (when)
-
1996
- Creator
- Table of contents
- Rights
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
11.06.2025, 1:35 PM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Hochschulschrift
Associated
- Theilen, Bernd
- Eul
Time of origin
- 1996
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