Arbeitspapier

Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard

We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers rated poorly prior to the change, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had the choice between exiting'€”a reduction in adverse selection'€”and improved behavior'€”a reduction in moral hazard'€”, they preferred the latter because of lower cost. Increasing market transparency improves on market outcomes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 426

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Thema
Anonymous markets
adverse selection
moral hazard
reputation building mechanisms
market transparency
market design

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Klein, Tobias J.
Lambertz, Christian
Stahl, Konrad O.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17291
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17291-0
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Klein, Tobias J.
  • Lambertz, Christian
  • Stahl, Konrad O.
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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