Hochschulschrift
Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISBN
-
9783890125077
3890125077
- Maße
-
21 cm
- Umfang
-
VII, 179 S.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
graph. Darst.
Zugl.: Kiel, Univ., Diss., 1995
- Erschienen in
-
Reihe Quantitative Ökonomie ; Bd. 72
- Schlagwort
-
Kontrakttheorie
Agency-Theorie
Moral Hazard
Adverse Selektion
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Bergisch Gladbach, Köln, Lohmar
- (wer)
-
Eul
- (wann)
-
1996
- Urheber
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Rechteinformation
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
11.06.2025, 13:35 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte
- Theilen, Bernd
- Eul
Entstanden
- 1996
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Multidimensional Types
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Multidimensional Types
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Multidimensional Types
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection