Arbeitspapier
Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two information asymmetries are mutually enforcing each other; if one is relaxed, delegated search is efficient. With both asymmetries prevailing simultaneously, search is almost surely inefficient (it is stopped too early). Second-best remuneration is shown to optimally utilize a menu of simple bonus contracts. In contrast to standard adverse selection problems, indirect nonlinear tariffs are strictly dominated.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 462
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Economics of Contract: Theory
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
adverse selection
bonus contracts
delegated search
moral hazard
optimal stopping
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ulbricht, Robert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2014
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.20865
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-20865-2
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ulbricht, Robert
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2014
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Multidimensional Types
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Adverse Selection und Moral Hazard in der Privat- und Sozialversicherung
Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection
Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard
Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Multidimensional Types
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Adverse Selection und Moral Hazard in der Privat- und Sozialversicherung
Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection
Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard
Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Multidimensional Types
Adverse selection and moral hazard in anonymous markets
Adverse Selection und Moral Hazard in der Privat- und Sozialversicherung
Optimal contract and organizational design under moral hazard and adverse selection
Venture capital, double-sided adverse selection, and double-sided moral hazard