Artikel

Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard

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The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two information asymmetries are mutually enforcing each other; if one is relaxed, delegated search is efficient. With both asymmetries prevailing simultaneously, search is almost surely inefficient (it is stopped too early). Second-best remuneration is shown to optimally utilize a menu of simple bonus contracts. In contrast to standard adverse selection problems, indirect nonlinear tariffs are strictly dominated.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 253-278 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Economics of Contract: Theory
Noncooperative Games
Thema
Adverse selection
bonus contracts
delegated search
moral hazard
optimal stopping

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ulbricht, Robert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1801
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Original beim Datenpartner anzeigen

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Ulbricht, Robert
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2016

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