Arbeitspapier
Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers rated poorly prior to the change, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had the choice between exiting a reduction in adverse selection and improved behavior a reduction in moral hazard , they preferred the latter because of lower cost. Increasing market transparency improves on market outcomes.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4552
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Market Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Subject
-
anonymous markets
adverse selection
moral hazard
reputation building mechanisms
market transparency
market design
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Klein, Tobias J.
Lambertz, Christian
Stahl, Konrad O.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2013
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Klein, Tobias J.
- Lambertz, Christian
- Stahl, Konrad O.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2013
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