Artikel
The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Games; ISSN: 2073-4336; Volume: 9; Year: 2018; Issue: 1; Pages: 1-22
Bezug (was)
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
adverse selection
moral hazard
risk aversion
prudence
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
adverse selection
moral hazard
risk aversion
prudence
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
Maréchal, François
Thomas, Lionel
Basel: MDPI
Thomas, Lionel
Basel: MDPI
Erschienen
Basel: MDPI
- Rechteinformation
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
18.10.2021, 08:57 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Maréchal, François
- Thomas, Lionel
- Basel: MDPI
Entstanden
- Basel: MDPI
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