Team incentives under moral and altruistic preferences: Wich team to choose?

Artikel

This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in a team setting with two agents whose efforts affect output stochastically, I demonstrate that the power of extrinsic incentives decreases with the degrees of morality and altruism displayed by the agents, thus leading to increased profits for the principal. I also show that a team of moral agents will only be preferred if the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to efforts; the probability of a high realization of output conditional on both agents exerting effort is sufficiently high; and either the outside option for the agents is zero or the degree of morality is sufficiently low.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-24 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: moral hazard in teams ; optimal contracts ; homo moralis preferences ; altruism

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Sarkisian, Roberto
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): MDPI
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g8030037
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179147
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ