Collective Incentives and Cooperation in Teams with Imperfect Monitoring

Arbeitspapier

We experimentally explore the role of collective incentives in sustaining cooperation in finitely repeated public goods games with imperfect monitoring. In our experiment players only observe noisy signals about individual contributions, while total output is perfectly observed. We consider sanctioning mechanisms that allow agents to commit to collective punishment in case total output fall short of a target. We find that cooperation is higher in the case of collective punishment compared to both the case of no punishment and the case of standard peer-to-peer punishment which conditions on the noisy signals. Further experiments indicate that both the commitment possibility and the collective nature of punishment matter for the positive effect of collective incentives on cooperation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2018:11

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
• Thema: Public goods game ; Team production ; Punishment ; Collective sanctions ; Imperfect monitoring

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Mengel, Friederike ; Mohlin, Erik ; Weidenholzer, Simon
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (wo): Lund
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260240
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ