Arbeitspapier

Helping under a Combination of Team and Tournament Incentives

We study how help can be fostered by means of a team bonus in the presence of rank-order tournaments. In a simple model we combine elements of relative rewards and a team bonus and study their effect on effort, help and sabotage. Quite intuitively the theoretical analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. This problem is mitigated by a team bonus that is proportional to the output of the whole team. We compare different parameter constellations of the theoretical benchmark with behavior observed in a one-shot experiment.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12267

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Labor Contracts
Organization of Production
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
help
relative rewards
team incentives
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Danilov, Anastasia
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Harbring, Christine
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Danilov, Anastasia
  • Irlenbusch, Bernd
  • Harbring, Christine
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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