Arbeitspapier
Helping under a Combination of Team and Tournament Incentives
We study how help can be fostered by means of a team bonus in the presence of rank-order tournaments. In a simple model we combine elements of relative rewards and a team bonus and study their effect on effort, help and sabotage. Quite intuitively the theoretical analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. This problem is mitigated by a team bonus that is proportional to the output of the whole team. We compare different parameter constellations of the theoretical benchmark with behavior observed in a one-shot experiment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12267
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Labor Contracts
Organization of Production
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
-
help
relative rewards
team incentives
experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Danilov, Anastasia
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Harbring, Christine
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Danilov, Anastasia
- Irlenbusch, Bernd
- Harbring, Christine
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2019