Arbeitspapier

A model of tournament incentives with corruption

We provide a theory of how growth, corruption, and a low-powered public-sector pay scale coexist in a stable equilibrium in the early stage of China's development. The regionally decentralized authoritarian regime of China features lower-level government officials competing for promotion to a higher level in the government by generating local economic growth, and calls for high-powered incentives to elicit effort from the the officials. However, this is at odds with the generally low-powered public-sector pay scale in China. We propose a principal-agent model, where the principal represents the Chinese people's desire to pursue economic growth and the agents are the government officials delegated with production tasks and organized in a tournament, to address how a low-powered pay scale can effectively elicit effort in a tournament infested with widespread corruption.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 872

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Public Sector Labor Markets
Institutions and Growth
Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy; Property Rights
Subject
Institution
Tournament
Corruption
China

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Wang, Bin
Zheng, Yu
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
(where)
London
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Wang, Bin
  • Zheng, Yu
  • Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Time of origin

  • 2018

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