Arbeitspapier
A model of tournament incentives with corruption
We provide a theory of how growth, corruption, and a low-powered public-sector pay scale coexist in a stable equilibrium in the early stage of China's development. The regionally decentralized authoritarian regime of China features lower-level government officials competing for promotion to a higher level in the government by generating local economic growth, and calls for high-powered incentives to elicit effort from the the officials. However, this is at odds with the generally low-powered public-sector pay scale in China. We propose a principal-agent model, where the principal represents the Chinese people's desire to pursue economic growth and the agents are the government officials delegated with production tasks and organized in a tournament, to address how a low-powered pay scale can effectively elicit effort in a tournament infested with widespread corruption.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 872
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Public Sector Labor Markets
Institutions and Growth
Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Political Economy; Property Rights
- Subject
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Institution
Tournament
Corruption
China
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Wang, Bin
Zheng, Yu
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (where)
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London
- (when)
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2018
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Wang, Bin
- Zheng, Yu
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Time of origin
- 2018