Arbeitspapier

Helping under a Combination of Team and Tournament Incentives

We study how help can be fostered by means of a team bonus in the presence of rank-order tournaments. In a simple model we combine elements of relative rewards and a team bonus and study their effect on effort, help and sabotage. Quite intuitively the theoretical analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. This problem is mitigated by a team bonus that is proportional to the output of the whole team. We compare different parameter constellations of the theoretical benchmark with behavior observed in a one-shot experiment.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12267

Classification
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Labor Contracts
Organization of Production
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Subject
help
relative rewards
team incentives
experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Danilov, Anastasia
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Harbring, Christine
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Danilov, Anastasia
  • Irlenbusch, Bernd
  • Harbring, Christine
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2019

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