Arbeitspapier

Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy

This paper combines the problem of optimal income taxation with the free-rider problem in public good provision. There are two groups of individuals with private information on their earning ability and their valuation of a public good. Adjustments of the transfer system are needed to discourage the more productive from exaggerating the desirability of public good provision. Similarly, the less productive need to be prevented from understating their valuation. Relative to an optimal income tax, which focuses solely on earning ability, income transfers are increased whenever a public good is installed and are decreased otherwise.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 97

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Public Goods
Thema
Income Taxation
Public Good Provision
Revelation of Preferences
Two-dimensional Heterogeneity

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bierbrauer, Felix
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(wo)
München
(wann)
2006

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13454
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13454-1
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bierbrauer, Felix
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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