Arbeitspapier
Mechanism design and voting for public-good provision
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of public-good provision. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit, provision can only depend on the population share of people in favour of provision. Robust implementability and coalition proofness thus provide a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms. The analysis is also extended to a specifi cation with more than two public-good provision levels.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2011,31
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Public Goods
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Welfare Economics: General
- Thema
-
Mechanism Design
Public-good provision
Large Economy
Voting Mechanisms
Öffentliches Gut
Versorgung
Wahlverhalten
Mechanism Design
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bierbrauer, Felix
Hellwig, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bierbrauer, Felix
- Hellwig, Martin
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2011
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