Arbeitspapier
Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods
We study the provision of an excludable public good to discuss whether the imposition of participation constraints is desirable. It is shown that this question may equivalently be cast as follows: should a firm that produces a public good receive tax revenues, or face a self-financing requirement. The main result is that the desirability of participation constraints is shaped by an equity-efficiency tradeoff: While first-best is out of reach with participation constraints, their imposition yields a more equitable distribution of the surplus. This result relies on an incomplete contracts perspective. With a benevolent mechanism designer, participation constraints are never desirable.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,01
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Public Goods
Economics of Regulation
- Thema
-
Mechanism Design
Incomplete Contracts
Public Goods
Regulation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Bierbrauer, Felix
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bierbrauer, Felix
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2010