Arbeitspapier
Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement
We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. Complete contracts conditioning on all future realizations of the state are infeasible. We show that contractual incompleteness comes without a cost. The buyer achieves the same surplus with complete and incomplete contracts. The key insight is that the allocation prescribed by optimal complete contracts is sequentially optimal with incomplete contracts if the buyer does not receive too much information ex-interim. We show that the English auction restricts the information optimally.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 19-040
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
- Thema
-
incomplete contracts
repeated relationships
procurement
commitment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gretschko, Vitali
Pollrich, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
- (wo)
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Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gretschko, Vitali
- Pollrich, Martin
- ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Entstanden
- 2019