Optimal income taxation and public-goods provision with preference and productivity shocks

Arbeitspapier

We study how an optimal income tax and an optimal public-goods provision rule respond to preference and productivity shocks. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. We therefore extend the Mirrleesian model so as to include a requirement of coalition-proofness. The main results are the following: first, the possibility of preference shocks yields a new set of collective incentive constraints. Productivity shocks have no such implication. Second, the optimal policy gives rise to a positive correlation between the public-goods provision level, the extent of redistribution and marginal tax rates.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,18

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Public Goods
• Thema: Public Goods ; Optimal Taxation ; Mechanism Design ; Einkommensteuer ; Optimale Besteuerung ; Verteilungspolitik ; Präferenztheorie ; Produktivität ; Schock ; Öffentliches Gut ; Versorgung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bierbrauer, Felix
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38868
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ