Arbeitspapier
Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision
We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on public good provision face an own incentive scheme that differs from the tax system. We then study democratic mechanisms with the property that tax payers vote over public goods. Under such a mechanism, efficiency cannot be reached and welfare from public good provision declines as the inequality between rich and poor individuals increases.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2008,9
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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Public goods
optimal taxation
two-dimensional heterogeneity
asymmetric information
Optimale Besteuerung
Finanzpolitik
Öffentliches Gut
Allokationseffizienz
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Wahlverhalten
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bierbrauer, Felix
Sahm, Marco
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bierbrauer, Felix
- Sahm, Marco
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Time of origin
- 2008
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