Arbeitspapier

Cost-Benefit Rules for Public Good Provision with Distortionary Taxation

The paper shows that a comparison of the appropriately-weighted sum of households' marginal willingness to pay for a public good with the net effect of the increased supply of the public good on shadow, as distinct from actual, government revenue is a generally valid rule for public good provision. This rule does not depend on any assumption that existing policy is optimal. The practical problems in measuring the true social cost of additional public good provision involve the need to estimate shadow prices of non-traded goods and goods which are not traded at given world prices The marginal cost of public funds is not required in order to measure the social cost of public good provision.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 544

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Edwards, Jeremy
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Edwards, Jeremy
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2001

Other Objects (12)