Arbeitspapier

Bequests, Control Rights, and Cost-Benefit Analysis

Consider a public project which produces a consumption good and which benefits future generations. Let a conventional cost-benefit analysis find that it gives higher benefits than projects it would dis-place in the private sector. Voters may nevertheless oppose the public project: the combination of a desire to control bequests and the lack of control over who gets benefits from a public project makes the public project unattractive. In contrast, private projects have owners, allowing parents to control whether their children will receive the benefits from such projects. Parents can therefore better influence the behavior of their children when they have the option of giving the children title to private projects.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 576

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
public projects
cost-benefit analysis

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Glazer, Amihai
Kanniainen, Vesa
Niskanen, Esko
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Glazer, Amihai
  • Kanniainen, Vesa
  • Niskanen, Esko
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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