Arbeitspapier

Voluntary participation in the design of non-excludable public goods provision mechanisms

Groves-Ledyard (1977) constructed a mechanism attaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of public goods. After this path-breaking paper, many mechanisms have been proposed to attain desirable allocations with public goods. Thus, economists have thought that the free-rider problem is solved, in theory. Our view to this problem is not so optimistic. Rather, we propose fundamental impossibility theorems with public goods. In the previous mechanism design, it was implicitly assumed that every agent must participate in the mechanism that the designer provides. This approach neglects one of the basic features of public goods: non-excludability. We explicitly incorporate non-excludability and then show that it is impossible to construct a mechanism in which every agent has an incentive to participate.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 559

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Öffentliche Güter
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Spieltheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
Yamamoto, Takehiko
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
  • Yamamoto, Takehiko
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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