Arbeitspapier
Voluntary participation in the design of non-excludable public goods provision mechanisms
Groves-Ledyard (1977) constructed a mechanism attaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of public goods. After this path-breaking paper, many mechanisms have been proposed to attain desirable allocations with public goods. Thus, economists have thought that the free-rider problem is solved, in theory. Our view to this problem is not so optimistic. Rather, we propose fundamental impossibility theorems with public goods. In the previous mechanism design, it was implicitly assumed that every agent must participate in the mechanism that the designer provides. This approach neglects one of the basic features of public goods: non-excludability. We explicitly incorporate non-excludability and then show that it is impossible to construct a mechanism in which every agent has an incentive to participate.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 559
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Öffentliche Güter
Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
Yamamoto, Takehiko
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
- Yamamoto, Takehiko
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2001