Arbeitspapier

Endogenous move structure and voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experiment

In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)'s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian's model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2010-14

Classification
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Subject
public goods
voluntary contributions
sequential contributions
endogenous timing
action commitment
observable delay
experiment
Öffentliches Gut
Spende
Spieltheorie
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Nosenzo, Daniele
Sefton, Martin
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
(where)
Nottingham
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Nosenzo, Daniele
  • Sefton, Martin
  • The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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