Arbeitspapier
Endogenous Timing and Income Inequality in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment
This paper investigates how the heterogenous incomes and preferences of potential donors affect the timing of contribution decisions when it is endogenously determined by contributors themselves. More specifically, we use a simple setting with two donors, Cobb-Douglas preferences, and complete information to investigate how income inequality affects the endogenous choices of contribution timing and the level of the voluntary supplied public goods. This paper obtains the following results. First, when income is extremely unequal, potential contributors are indifferent between the timing choices of simultaneous and sequential moves, even if they have different preferences towards a public good. Second, as income inequality decreases, the simultaneous move-game is increasingly likely to emerge, because all potential contributors prefer to act as a leader. Third, in the presence of multiple public goods, contributors with higher valuations for one public good tend to be first contributors to that one. Fourth, these theoretical predictions regarding the timing decisions of individuals are not supported by the laboratory experiment, although those regarding individuals’ contribution decisions are consistent with the experimental results.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7441
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Public Goods
Publicly Provided Private Goods
- Thema
-
Nash equilibrium
Stackelberg equilibrium
public good
endogenous timing
voluntary provision
income distribution
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Itaya, Jun-ichi
Mizushima, Atsue
Kurosaka, Kengo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft.
Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Itaya, Jun-ichi
- Mizushima, Atsue
- Kurosaka, Kengo
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2018
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