Arbeitspapier
Optimal income taxation and public goods provision in a large economy with aggregate uncertainty
We study a large economy model in which individuals have private information about their productive abilities and their preferences. Moreover, there is aggregate uncertainty so that the social benefits from taxation and public goods provision are a priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to individual beliefs and a requirement of coalition-proofness. The paper provides a tractable and intuitive characterization of incentive-feasible tax and expenditure policies: Incentive constraints associated with productive abilities reflect only individual behavior, whereas those associated with public goods preferences reflect only collective behavior.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2701
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Public Goods
- Thema
-
optimal taxation
public goods provision
revelation of preferences
robust mechanism design
Optimale Besteuerung
Öffentliches Gut
Mechanism
Offenbarte Präferenzen
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bierbrauer, Felix
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bierbrauer, Felix
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2009
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