Arbeitspapier
On the optimality of optimal income taxation
The Mirrleesian model of income taxation restricts attention to simple allocation mechanism with no strategic interdependence, i.e., the optimal labor supply of any one individual does not depend on the labor supply of others. It has been argued by Piketty (1993) that this restriction is substantial because more sophisticated mechanisms can reach first-best allocations that are out of reach with simple mechanisms. In this paper, we assess the validity of Piketty's critique in an independent private values model. As a main result, we show that the optimal sophisticated mechanism is a simple mechanism, or, equivalently, a Mirrleesian income tax system.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,14
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
-
Optimal Income Taxation
Mechanism Design
Einkommensteuer
Optimale Besteuerung
Mechanism Design
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bierbrauer, Felix
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bierbrauer, Felix
- Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Entstanden
- 2010