Arbeitspapier

On the optimality of optimal income taxation

The Mirrleesian model of income taxation restricts attention to simple allocation mechanism with no strategic interdependence, i.e., the optimal labor supply of any one individual does not depend on the labor supply of others. It has been argued by Piketty (1993) that this restriction is substantial because more sophisticated mechanisms can reach first-best allocations that are out of reach with simple mechanisms. In this paper, we assess the validity of Piketty's critique in an independent private values model. As a main result, we show that the optimal sophisticated mechanism is a simple mechanism, or, equivalently, a Mirrleesian income tax system.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2010,14

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Economics of Contract: Theory
Thema
Optimal Income Taxation
Mechanism Design
Einkommensteuer
Optimale Besteuerung
Mechanism Design
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bierbrauer, Felix
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bierbrauer, Felix
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2010

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