Arbeitspapier
Optimal income taxation with tax competition
We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry and increases employment of the less productive individuals. When countries are heterogeneous, this effect is more pronounced in the smaller country.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3108
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
International Migration
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Thema
-
optimal income tax
migration
unemployment
tax competition
Leviathan government
Einkommensteuer
Steuerwettbewerb
Optimale Besteuerung
Internationale Arbeitsmobilität
Qualifikation
Spieltheorie
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Leviathan-Modell
Beschäftigungseffekt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lipatov, Vilen
Weichenrieder, Alfons J.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lipatov, Vilen
- Weichenrieder, Alfons J.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2010
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