- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
0931-6558
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Edition
-
October 2013
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; 489
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Bielefeld
- (who)
-
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics
- (when)
-
2013
- Creator
- Contributor
-
Universität Bielefeld
Center for Mathematical Economics
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-27006968
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
25.03.2025, 1:48 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Diehl, Christoph
- Kuzmics, Christoph
- Universität Bielefeld
- Center for Mathematical Economics
- Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics
Time of origin
- 2013
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Ordinal cheap talk
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Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
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