Arbeitspapier
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state-independent. We show that only the babbling equilibrium survives the introduction of any small degree of uncertainty about the sender's preferences in the spirit of Harsanyi (1973). None of the influential equilibria are robust to this kind of uncertainty.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 489
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Diehl, Christoph
Kuzmics, Christoph
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-27006968
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Diehl, Christoph
- Kuzmics, Christoph
- Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Entstanden
- 2013
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