Artikel
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 95-123 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
- Subject
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Bayesian game
cheap talk
communication equilibrium
correlated equilibrium
pre-play communication
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Forges, Françoise
Vida, Péter
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2013
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE944
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Forges, Françoise
- Vida, Péter
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2013
Other Objects (12)
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
Similarity of Correlated Equilibria
Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria
Correlated Equilibria with Payoff Uncertainty
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
Similarity of Correlated Equilibria
Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria
Correlated Equilibria with Payoff Uncertainty
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals
Similarity of Correlated Equilibria
Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria
Correlated Equilibria with Payoff Uncertainty
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions