Artikel
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 95-123 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
- Thema
-
Bayesian game
cheap talk
communication equilibrium
correlated equilibrium
pre-play communication
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Forges, Françoise
Vida, Péter
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2013
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE944
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Forges, Françoise
- Vida, Péter
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2013
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