Arbeitspapier
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
Signaling games with infinite action spaces may have no sequential equilibrium. We prove that adding cheap talk to these games solves the non-existence problem; the sequential equilibrium outcome correspondence is upper hemi-continuous. In addition, when the signaling space has sufficiently many signals, any cheap talk sequential equilibrium outcome can be appproximated by a sequential (e)-equilibrium of the game without cheap talk. In these cases, adding cheap talk does not fundamentally alter the nature of the game.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1074
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Iorio, Karl
Manelli, Alejandro M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1993
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Iorio, Karl
- Manelli, Alejandro M.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1993
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