Arbeitspapier
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
Signaling games with infinite action spaces may have no sequential equilibrium. We prove that adding cheap talk to these games solves the non-existence problem; the sequential equilibrium outcome correspondence is upper hemi-continuous. In addition, when the signaling space has sufficiently many signals, any cheap talk sequential equilibrium outcome can be appproximated by a sequential (e)-equilibrium of the game without cheap talk. In these cases, adding cheap talk does not fundamentally alter the nature of the game.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1074
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Iorio, Karl
Manelli, Alejandro M.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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1993
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Iorio, Karl
- Manelli, Alejandro M.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1993
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Ordinal cheap talk
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
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Information design in cheap talk