Arbeitspapier
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
This paper shows the existence of sequential and weak-best-response equilibria for cheap-talk extensions of signaling games for a class of signaling games called communication-impervious. An example shows there are well-behaved infinite signaling games with no sequential equilibria. The assumption that talk is cheap seems reasonable in many economic contexts and yields a very straightforward solution to the existence problem in infinite signaling games. The cheap-talk assumption opens the possibility of extending the methods of this paper to prove the existence of equilibrium in more-general extensive-form games with infinite action and information sets.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 915
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Iorio, Karl
Manuelli, Alejandro M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1990
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Iorio, Karl
- Manuelli, Alejandro M.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1990
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
A comment on "Sequential Equilibria"
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Automatic verification of sequential infinite state processes
Sequential Vs Simultaneous Equilibria in A Differentiated Duopoly
The number of equilibria of smooth infinite economies
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
A comment on "Sequential Equilibria"
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Automatic verification of sequential infinite state processes
Sequential Vs Simultaneous Equilibria in A Differentiated Duopoly
The number of equilibria of smooth infinite economies
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 2: Cheap Talk
Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria
A comment on "Sequential Equilibria"
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Automatic verification of sequential infinite state processes
Sequential Vs Simultaneous Equilibria in A Differentiated Duopoly
The number of equilibria of smooth infinite economies
Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case