Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals

Arbeitspapier

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game by representing these categories by Voronoi languages. As the strategy set is infinite static stability concepts for finite games such as ESS are no longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We give examples of unstable strict Nash equilibria and stable inefficient Voronoi languages. We derive efficient Voronoi languages with a large number of categories and numerically illustrate stability of some Voronoi languages with large message spaces and non-uniformly distributed types.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Papers ; No. 420

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Thema: Cheap talk ; Signaling game ; Communication game ; Dynamic stability ; Voronoi tesselation ; Kommunikation ; Spieltheorie ; Signalling ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Jäger, Gerhard ; Koch-Metzger, Lars ; Riedel, Frank
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
• (wo): Bielefeld
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43778
• URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-15602
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ