Arbeitspapier
Cheap Talk and Burned Money
We augment the standard Crawford-Sobel (Econometrica 1982) model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages. The issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to use a costly signal ("burned money"); the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information; and the extent to which burning money is the preferred instrument for information transmission.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1245
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Austen-Smith, David
Banks, Jeffrey S.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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1998
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Austen-Smith, David
- Banks, Jeffrey S.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1998
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